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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Christine Lagarde, the President of the European Central Bank (ECB), has recently 
promised to explore every avenue for greening the ECB’s operations, including its 
quantitative easing (QE) programme. Yet the current corporate QE programme remains 
biased towards carbon-intensive sectors: these sectors are over-represented in the ECB 
purchases, when compared to their contribution to the euro area employment and 
economic activity. An important consequence of the carbon bias is that it may lower the 
cost of borrowing (an implicit subsidy) and encourage more debt issuance by the most 
carbon intensive firms relative to low-carbon firms. By favouring access to finance for 
highly polluting companies, this carbon bias is an important barrier to the 
decarbonisation of the euro area economies.  
We argue that the ECB should abandon its market neutrality approach, the key driver of 
this carbon bias, and adopt alternative low-carbon strategies. We suggest two such 
strategies in which carbon-intensive bonds are replaced with more climate-friendly 
bonds. These strategies would significantly reduce the climate footprint of the ECB 
corporate QE and would make companies’ access to finance more aligned with the 
targets of the Paris Agreement.      
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1. INTRODUCTION  
In July 2020, Christine Lagarde, the President of the European Central Bank (ECB), 
promised to explore every avenue for greening the ECB’s operations, including the asset 
purchase scheme undertaken to help stimulate the Eurozone economy.1 Indeed, the 
rapid and profound economic devastation brought on by the coronavirus pandemic 
illustrates the vulnerability of our economies to catastrophic shocks and should prompt 
central banks to hasten progress towards a low-carbon transition. The ECB simply 
cannot afford to address one crisis whilst neglecting – if not worsening – another.  
Central banks in general are hardly the only game in town when it comes to tackling 
environmental breakdown. Yet they do have a critical role to play in structurally 
realigning our financial sector with the challenges and risks posed by the climate crisis.2 
Responsible for monetary policy and large swathes of financial regulation, the ECB’s 
operations heavily influence the allocation of financial flows and market prices. Now is 
the time to consider how Europe’s most powerful economic institution can ensure its 
operations are aligned, rather than at odds, with the goals of a green transition.   
In this brief, we first document the ECB’s ongoing carbon bias in one key pillar of its 
Quantitative Easing (QE) program – corporate bond purchases. The ECB does hold a 
significant amount of green bonds (debt instruments earmarked specifically to finance 
climate and environmentally friendly projects).3 But overall its corporate purchases are 
structurally misaligned with EU commitments to the Paris Climate Agreement and do 
not adequately reflect climate-related financial risks. In fact, by implicitly creating better 
financing conditions for carbon-intensive activities, the Corporate Sector Purchase 
Programme (CSPP) biases the allocation of capital towards the most carbon-intensive 
sectors. Therefore, it is particularly significant that the ECB does explore every avenue 
available to decarbonise its monetary policy operations and align them with 
democratically defined objectives of a green transition. It has already taken the welcome 
step of including sustainability-linked bonds in the list of assets that it accepts as 
collateral for lending operations.4 But it needs to go further, faster.  
To do so, we argue, it needs to reconsider the so-called ‘market neutrality’, the 
underlying principle that guides corporate asset purchases and hardwires a carbon bias 
into its unconventional purchases. The ECB has recently admitted that market neutrality 
might be problematic as a benchmark given that the markets have failed to produce 
climate-efficient outcomes.5 We agree with that and we suggest two alternative 
scenarios that would reduce significantly the climate footprint of the ECB’s corporate QE 
purchases. In the ‘lower-carbon’ scenario, the ECB stops buying bonds issued by fossil 
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fuel companies and by companies with relatively high carbon intensity6 that belong to 
the energy-intensive, non-renewable utilities and carbon-intensive transportation 
sectors. Instead, the ECB would purchase bonds of potentially green and renewable 
sectors, as well as green bonds and bonds of ‘other’ non-carbon-intensive sectors. The 
second, ‘low-carbon’ scenario excludes all the bonds issued by carbon-intensive sectors, 
apart from green bonds, but relaxes the investment grade criterion. 
Implementing these would not only be in line with the climate emergency that we are 
currently facing but would also support climate-related financial stability objectives.   
 
  
6 Decarbonising is Easy: Beyond Market Neutrality in the ECB’s Corporate QE 
 
 
 
 
2. THE ECB’S CORPORATE SECTOR 
PURCHASE PROGRAMME (CSPP) 
The CSPP is core to the ECB’s QE interventions. It was launched in June 2016 and by 
early 2020, the ECB’s corporate bond holdings had exceeded €200bn – roughly 13% of 
all the euro-denominated non-bank corporate bonds eligible under its programme. 
Then in March 2020, as part of its Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), 
the ECB announced the increase in the holdings of corporate bonds and the expansion 
of the range of eligible assets under the CSPP. By the end of July 2020, the CSPP/PEPP 
corporate bond holdings amounted to €241.6bn7 - roughly 16% of all the bonds eligible 
under its programme.  
Why did the ECB introduce the CSPP? As its main policy tool – the overnight interest 
rate – reached the zero lower bound, traditional rate cuts could not, according to the 
ECB, further boost aggregate demand (spending and investment). To stimulate the 
economy, the ECB began targeting long-term interest rates by intervening directly in 
financial markets through the purchase of government bonds, corporate bonds, asset-
backed securities and covered bonds. CSPP purchases were expected to increase 
demand for corporate bonds and lower the cost of borrowing for bond issuers, 
encouraging companies to increase their bond issuance and investment.8 Overall, it was 
intended that bond purchases would raise aggregate demand and achieve an inflation 
rate of below, but close, to 2%.  
The ECB decides its corporate QE purchases by first specifying a target for the value of 
bonds that it wishes to hold on its balance sheet. It then identifies the eligible bond 
universe by applying a set of criteria to the entire universe of euro-denominated, non-
bank corporate bonds. Bonds should have been issued by euro area non-bank 
corporations, should be of a specific maturity and should be investment grade (see 
Appendix A1 for more details). Once it establishes the eligible bond universe, the ECB 
buys a proportion of the bonds included in this universe based on the target that it has 
set about its holdings. Its bond purchases are driven by the ‘market neutrality’ principle 
(see section 4): the composition of CSPP holdings is generally intended to reflect the 
existing eligible bond market structure. The ECB applies this approach by ensuring its 
purchases mirror the eligible CSPP bond universe by country, sector, and rating group. 
Figure 1 illustrates that: the breakdown of CSPP holdings in the first quarter of 2020 
mirrors closely the breakdown of the eligible CSPP bond universe. For example, the 
‘Construction and materials’ sector represents 5% of the value of bonds in the eligible 
bond universe (the latter is the ‘market’ in the ‘market neutrality’ principle) and as a 
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result, the ECB buys bonds issued by this sector such that the ‘Construction and 
materials’ sector represents 5% of the CSPP holdings.     
 
Figure 1: CSPP holdings and eligible CSPP bond universe, by country, sector and credit rating, as of Q1 
2020  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ECB, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html  
 
The sectoral data provided by the ECB does not allow us to establish the carbon 
intensity of its corporate bond purchases, or to identify alternative (greener) pathways 
for corporate bond purchases. To do so, we take a granular approach. We first apply the 
ECB’s eligibility criteria to data for bonds that we have downloaded from Thomson 
Reuters (TR) Eikon. We thus obtain the eligible bond universe, which consists of 2,715 
bond issues with a total value of about €1,512bn (see Figure 2). We identify the 1,546 
bond issues that the ECB has purchased under CSPP/PEPP (this information is available 
on the website of the ECB), which we term the ECB list (as of July 2020). Using TR 
Eikon, we calculate the outstanding amount of all bonds that are in the ECB list, which 
is equal to around €1,073bn. Problematically, while the ECB publishes the bond issues 
that it holds and the names of the companies that have issued these bonds, it does not 
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publish the exact volumes of each bond issue that it holds. For example, we know that 
the ECB holds 18 bonds issued by Royal Dutch Shell, but we do not know the volumes 
of each issue that the ECB has bought. This means that we do not know the exact 
financial support that the ECB provides to this company. The ECB only publishes the 
total value of holdings which, as of July 2020, were €241.6bn.  
 
Figure 2: Eligible bond universe, ECB list and bonds held by the ECB, as of July 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: ECB (number of bonds in the ECB list as of 31 July 2020; value of ECB holdings as of 31 July 2020) and 
TR Eikon (bond outstanding amount; number of bonds in the eligible bond universe, July 2020) 
 
In the following sections we analyse the carbon footprint of the bonds in the ECB list. 
Our granular approach allows us to demonstrate that the ECB list exhibits a pronounced 
carbon bias: more than half of the outstanding amount of the bonds included in the 
ECB list are issued by carbon-intensive sectors. The carbon bias, we argue, is the 
consequence of the application of the market neutrality principle, a principle 
inconsistent with the urgent need for a low-carbon transition. We show that if the ECB 
stops applying this principle, it can replace the carbon-intensive bonds in its list with 
more climate-friendly bonds, reducing the climate footprint of the QE programme.  
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3. THE CARBON BIAS IN CORPORATE QE    
The sectoral breakdown of the outstanding volume of the bonds included in the ECB list 
at the end of July 2020 shows that sectors with a high contribution to greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions are over-represented, when compared to euro area employment and 
Gross Value Added (GVA) (see Table 1). For example, ‘Electricity, gas and steam and air 
conditioning supply’ and ’Manufacturing’ are two of the highest polluting sectors in the 
economy, accounting for 54.8% of euro area GHG emissions. Collectively these sectors 
contribute only 13.8% to euro area employment and just 19% to euro area GVA, but 
account for 58.9% of the outstanding amount in the ECB list.9  
 
Table 1: Sectoral breakdown of the ECB list of corporate bonds held under CSPP/PEPP (outstanding amount), 
euro area GHG emissions, euro area employment and euro area GVA 
NACE 
code Sector 
ECB list of bonds 
- contribution to 
outstanding 
amount (%) 
Contribution 
to euro area 
GHG emissions 
(%) 
Contribution 
to euro area 
employment 
(%) 
Contributio
n to euro 
area GVA 
(%) 
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.1 15.2 3.1 1.6 
B Mining and quarrying 1.0 0.8 0.1 0.3 
C Manufacturing 43.1 26.9 13.4 17.2 
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 15.8 27.9 0.4 1.7 
E 
Water supply; sewerage, waste 
management and remediation 
activities 
1.6 4.7 0.7 0.9 
F Construction 1.3 1.8 6.0 4.9 
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 2.5 2.8 14.5 11.1 
H Transportation and storage 9.2 14.4 4.9 4.9 
I Accommodation and food service activities 0.6 0.6 5.4 3.0 
J Information and communication 11.4 0.3 2.9 4.9 
K Financial and insurance activities 2.8 0.2 2.4 4.8 
L Real estate activities 6.5 0.1 1.0 11.1 
M Professional, scientific and technical activities 1.0 0.5 6.7 6.7 
N Administrative and support service activities 0.6 0.6 7.3 4.8 
O Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 0.0 0.9 6.7 6.5 
P Education 1.7 0.5 6.4 4.7 
Q Human health and social work activities 0.6 1.0 11.1 7.5 
R Arts, entertainment and recreation 0.0 0.3 1.7 1.3 
S Other service activities 0.4 0.3 2.9 1.7 
T 
Activities of households as 
employers; undifferentiated goods & 
services producing activities of 
households for own use 
0.0 0.0 2.2 0.4 
Total 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes, as of 31 July 2020), TR Eikon (bond outstanding amount, July 2020), Eurostat (employment 
[2018], GVA [2018] and GHG emissions [2018])   
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Following on from a similar analysis for the Bank of England’s corporate bond purchase 
programme,10 we apply a more granular classification of sectors to further illustrate the 
carbon bias within the ECB’s holdings. Accordingly, we identify four carbon-intensive 
sectors:11 
(a) Fossil-fuel sectors that perform activities like the extraction of natural gas, the 
mining of hard coal and the manufacture of refined petroleum products;  
(b) energy-intensive sectors, most of which undertake manufacturing activities;  
(c) non-renewable utilities that are involved for example in the production and 
distribution of electricity;  
(d) carbon-intensive transportation sectors which are those sectors engaging in 
activities related primarily to car, air and sea transportation.     
These carbon-intensive sectors comprise approximately 62.7% of the value of corporate 
bonds in the ECB list.12  However, the contribution of these sectors to euro area 
employment and GVA is just 17.8% and 29.1% respectively. The sectoral allocation of 
purchases does not mirror the sectoral make-up of the euro area when it comes to 
employment and GVA share, and is significantly skewed towards the most carbon-
intensive sectors.    
 
Figure 3: Contribution of carbon-intensive sectors to the ECB list of bonds held under CSPP/PEPP 
(outstanding amount), euro area employment and euro area GVA
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes, as of 31 July 2020), TR Eikon (NACE 4-digit sectors and bond outstanding 
amount, July 2020), Eurostat, Annual detailed enterprise statistics for industry (employment [2017] and GVA 
[2017]) and authors’ calculations  
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A closer look at individual bonds purchased by the ECB illustrates in specific detail the 
carbon skew of the CSPP. The list includes some of the most emission intensive 
companies in Europe. Bonds purchased include a number of major European integrated 
oil and gas companies, some of the continent’s largest utilities, car manufacturers, 
airlines and airports as well as companies from diverse, fossil fuel-intensive sectors such 
as steel, chemicals and cement.  
A snapshot of some of the largest fossil fuel companies and utilities by sum of 
outstanding value, as well as selected companies from energy-intensive industries and 
carbon-intensive transportation, gives an indication of both the absolute impact these 
companies and their activities have on the climate crisis. Table 2 illustrates the absolute 
level of Scope 1-3 emissions and emissions per revenue generated by these high-carbon 
companies. Scope 1-3 emissions are particularly pertinent indicators for this exercise, 
given they are standards used to measure and manage a company’s emissions designed 
by the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, where: Scope 1 emissions are direct emissions from 
owned/controlled sources, Scope 2 are indirect emissions from the generation of 
purchased energy, and Scope 3 emissions are all indirect emissions (not included in 
Scope 2) across the entire value chain of the reporting company. The absolute level of 
emissions and the high level of emissions per revenue of these companies whose bonds 
are eligible under the CSPP are particularly striking. It is also notable that the renewable 
energy sector is not sufficiently represented in the ECB purchases, with proportionally 
fewer bonds of these companies purchased (e.g. WindMW) although they meet all the 
ECB eligibility criteria.13    
According to the ECB’s own empirical analyses14, the CSPP has a significant effect on 
the yields (borrowing costs) of the corporate bonds that happen to be eligible for 
purchase when compared to their ineligible counterparts.15 Given the carbon bias in the 
ECB’s holdings, this suggests that the CSPP effectively lowers the cost of borrowing (an 
implicit subsidy) for the most carbon-intensive firms when compared to low-carbon 
ones.      
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Table 2: Scope 1-3 GHG emissions and emission intensity (scope 1-3 emissions per revenue), selected 
carbon-intensive companies in the ECB list of corporate bonds held under CSPP/PEPP 
Carbon-intensive 
sectors Company 
Emissions 
 (million tonnes of  
CO2-e) 
Emission intensity 
(tonnes of  
CO2-e/million €) 
Fossil fuel ENI S.p.A. 296 4,240 
 Naturgy Energy Group SA 125 5,417 
 OMV AG 137 5,839 
 Royal Dutch Shell PLC 656 2,132 
 Total SE 455 2,894 
    
Non-renewable 
utilities EDF SA 152 2,131 
 E.ON SA 69 1,684 
 Enel S.p.A. 132 2,430 
 Engie SA 183 3,044 
 Iberdrola SA 65 1,778 
    
Carbon-intensive 
transportation Daimler AG 124 718 
 Ryanair Holdings PLC 12 1,521 
    
Energy-intensive ArcelorMital SA 196 3,111 
 BASF SE 121 2,037 
 HeidelbergCement AG 100 5,331 
 
Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes, as of 31 July 2020), TR Eikon (NACE 4-digit sectors [July 2020], Scope 1, Scope 2 
and Scope 3 CO2-e GHG emissions [2019] and revenues [2019]), company reports (Scope 3 CO2-e GHG emissions 
[2019] in the case of Royal Dutch Shell PLC and Daimler AG) and authors’ calculations 
Note: Ryanair Holdings PLC does not report data for Scope 3 CO2-e GHG emissions. In the case of Naturgy 
Energy Group SA, Royal Dutch Shell PLC, Total SE and Iberdrola SA, the ECB has bought bonds issued by their 
financial subsidiaries, which are Naturgy Finance BV, Shell International Finance BV, Total Capital SA and 
Iberdrola International BV, respectively. EDF SA and Ryanair Holdings PLC are the parent companies of RTE 
EDF Transport and Ryanair DAC, respectively, which have issued bonds bought by the ECB.  
 
Significantly, the structural carbon skew in the CSPP contravenes the spirit of the Paris 
Climate Agreement (which the ECB is party to) and the environmental goals set by 
democratically elected governments. Indeed, as former president of the ECB Mario 
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Draghi conceded, the ECB did not take into consideration the environmental impact of 
its policies.16 It could therefore be at risk of facing litigation for neglecting to evaluate 
and manage the climate and environmental impact of their policies.17 Finally, the carbon 
bias makes CSPP inconsistent with the ECB’s policy and commitments surrounding 
climate-related financial risks and the high prudential standards to which it is 
attempting to hold other private financial institutions to account.  
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4. MARKET NEUTRALITY 
The carbon bias of CSPP/PEPP is largely the result of the application of the market 
neutrality principle. The ECB implements this principle by buying corporate bonds that 
mirror the sectoral decomposition of the eligible corporate bond market. The ECB 
documents the market neutrality of its CSPP program by showing that the sectoral 
decomposition of its CSPP holdings is close to the sectoral decomposition of its eligible 
bond universe (see Figure 1 above). 
 
Table 3: Contribution of the carbon-intensive sectors to the euro non-bank corporate bond market 
(outstanding amount), the ECB list of bonds held under CSPP/PEPP (outstanding amount) and the euro 
area GVA 
 
1: All euro 
non-bank 
corporate 
bonds (%) 
2: 
(1)+euro 
area (%) 
3: 
(2)+eligible 
maturity 
(%) 
4: (3)+Investment 
grade (%) 
[Eligible bond 
universe] 
5: ECB list of 
bonds (%) 
Share of 
euro area 
GVA (%) 
Fossil fuel 7.8 7.3 7.1 9.0 11.9 1.1 
Energy-
intensive 
15.8 14.2 14.7 15.1 17.3 13.5 
Non-
renewable 
utilities 
7.3 8.8 9.1 11.6 14.5 2.0 
Carbon-
intensive 
transportation 
14.5 17.0 17.1 20.1 18.9 12.7 
Carbon-
intensive 
sectors 
45.5 47.2 48.0 55.8 62.7 29.1 
 
Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes, as of 31 July 2020), TR Eikon (NACE 4-digit sectors, bond outstanding amount 
and other financial and economic variables, July 2020), Eurostat, Annual detailed enterprise statistics for industry 
(GVA [2017]) and authors’ calculations 
 
However, the sectoral decomposition that the ECB provides says little about the carbon 
footprint of the eligible bond universe and the bonds held by the ECB. Table 3 illustrates 
step-by-step how the representation of carbon-intensive sectors changes as the 
eligibility criteria and the market neutrality principle are applied. In the universe of euro 
non-bank corporate bonds, the share of carbon-intensive sectors is 45.5% (column 1 in 
the table above). This increases to 55.8% once the eligibility criteria are applied (as we 
move from column 2 to column 4 in the table above).18 The increase in the 
representation of carbon-intensive bonds primarily reflects the fact that bonds issued by 
carbon-intensive companies tend to receive more favourable evaluations by credit rating 
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agencies compared to non-carbon intensive companies. The ECB therefore reproduces a 
market failure, as credit rating agencies do not incorporate climate risks into their 
evaluations of credit risk. Crucially, when the ECB specifies the bonds that it purchases 
by applying the market neutrality principle (attempting to mirror the sectoral 
decomposition of the eligible corporate bond market), the representation increases even 
more from 55.8% to 62.7% (column 5).  
When considering the environmental goals of democratically elected governments, there 
are at least two reasons why the ECB should reconsider the market neutrality principle. 
First, by applying the market neutrality principle, the ECB favours carbon-intensive 
companies and does not create any pressure for them to develop production models that 
generate less emissions. This is at odds with the climate emergency and the spirit of the 
Paris Agreement which suggests that all policy institutions should play a strong role in 
avoiding catastrophic climate change. Importantly, the transition to a low-carbon 
economy requires a change in the current market structure, which is clearly not aligned 
with the 2 degrees target, and much less the 1.5 degrees target. By choosing to represent 
the existing market structure, the ECB’s operations are actively inhibiting the transition 
to a low-carbon economy.19 They are also inconsistent with the ECB’s commitments in 
the Network for Greening the Financial System. 
Second, the implementation of the market neutrality principle in the corporate QE 
programme is inconsistent with financial stability objectives. In terms of physical risks, 
the corporate QE finances the generation of emissions that can lead to climate-related 
events that undermine financial stability in the long run. Also, the existing 
implementation of the neutrality principle neglects climate transition risks: while credit 
rating agencies and credit risk models do not explicitly consider these risks20, resulting in 
carbon-skewed credit ratings, the ECB should consider them in its CSPP/PEPP 
purchases.21    
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5. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS 
Given the problematic nature of the market neutrality principle from a climate 
perspective, how could the ECB design and implement its corporate QE programme 
once this principle is abandoned? In line with recent comments made by President 
Lagarde, we suggest that the ECB should explore every avenue that minimises the 
climate footprint of the corporate QE programme, ensuring at the same time that the 
holdings remain in line with the macroeconomic goal of supporting the eurozone 
economies during the pandemic.  
We propose two alternative scenarios (see Figure 4 below). In the ‘lower-carbon’ 
scenario, the ECB keeps the universe of eligible bonds unchanged, but stops buying 
bonds issued by (i) fossil fuel companies as well as (ii) companies with relatively high 
carbon intensity22 that belong to the energy-intensive, non-renewable utilities and 
carbon-intensive transportation sectors. Instead, the ECB would purchase bonds of 
potentially green and renewable sectors, as well as green bonds and bonds of ‘other’ 
non-carbon-intensive sectors (see Appendix A2 for our approach to identifying the 
climate footprint of bonds).23 All these changes can take place without modifying the 
current bond eligibility criteria. 
Should the ECB implement this scenario, the outstanding amount of bonds in the ECB 
list would become slightly higher than in the existing list. This scenario would not 
therefore constrain the ECB’s ability to affect interest rates during the COVID-19 crisis.   
We also consider a scenario in which the climate footprint of the ECB bond list is 
reduced even further – this is labelled ‘low-carbon list’ in Figure 4. In this scenario (i) we 
exclude all the bonds issued by carbon-intensive sectors, apart from green bonds and (ii) 
we include bonds that have been issued in the euro area and are of eligible maturity but 
are not necessarily of investment grade. As shown in Figure 4, when we do this, the 
outstanding amount in the bond list increases compared to the existing ECB list. 
Although this scenario does not keep the investment grade criterion for the eligibility of 
bonds, it should be kept in mind that, as mentioned above, the existing credit ratings do 
not reflect climate risks and this criterion should in any case be reconsidered from a 
climate risk perspective. In addition, if the ECB expands further the CSPP/PEPP 
programme, it might be unavoidable to include bonds that are not investment grade in 
the universe of eligible bonds.   
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Figure 4: Existing ECB list of bonds held under CSPP/PEPP (outstanding amount) vs lower-carbon lists 
 
 
Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes, as of 31 July 2020), TR Eikon (NACE 4-digit sectors, bond outstanding amount 
and other financial and economic variables, July 2020) and authors’ calculations 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The ECB is hardly the only game in town when it comes to tackling environmental 
breakdown – fiscal policy and wider regulation must also play a more prominent role 
than they are currently doing.24 But the ECB’s corporate QE programme does actively 
lower the borrowing costs for the firms whose bonds are held. In an era of the climate 
crisis, the ECB should therefore explore every avenue for decarbonising its corporate QE 
programme, to ensure it is not inhibiting a green transition by disproportionately 
advantaging carbon-intensive firms. In this brief we have suggested a framework that 
would allow the ECB to do just this. Our low-carbon scenarios are not only more 
consistent with the Paris Agreement, but they also support climate-informed financial 
stability objectives.  
The ECB can directly implement our scenarios. However, the transition from the existing 
holdings to our suggested ones could also take place more gradually in order for carbon-
intensive firms to have more time to adjust to the new reality and start issuing more 
green bonds in order to avoid being excluded from QE altogether.25 To provide a further 
boost to the green bond market, the ECB could also consider running a permanent QE 
programme that would hold bonds exclusively from this market alone.26 
Our proposals reflect the limits of data availability. For example, a practical limitation 
that we face is that a large number of companies do not report data about their 
emissions. However, the implementation of our proposals would place direct pressure 
on firms to publish more detailed data about their climate footprint. In the future, this 
would potentially allow the design and implementation of more sophisticated versions 
of our scenarios. But the longer the ECB delays the decarbonisation of its QE 
programme, the more firms will delay in providing climate-related data and taking 
action against the climate crisis itself.  
From a broader perspective, the ECB should not only consider the climate performance 
of firms in the design and implementation of the CSPP/PEPP programme. Other 
environmental issues (like the effects on biodiversity) should also be taken into account 
in the future. The ECB should also work with democratically elected officials and 
consider introducing social-related conditionalities in the support that it provides to 
companies via both the purchases of bonds and commercial papers. Incremental 
adjustments to finance are not enough to tackle the monumental challenge of a rapid, 
sustainable and fair transition to a clean economy. We will need innovative and 
disruptive reforms that help reshape our financial system, so that it can help sustain our 
planet and enable us to thrive. The ECB should take a nuanced approached to its role by 
adopting new ways of economic thinking before it is too late for the current and future 
generations.    
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APPENDIX 
A1. FROM THE UNIVERSE OF EURO-DENOMINATED 
NON-BANK CORPORATE BONDS TO THE ECB LIST OF 
BONDS HELD UNDER CSPP/PEPP  
We downloaded data for the universe of corporate bonds from Thomson Reuters (TR) 
Eikon and we applied the ECB eligibility criteria step-by-step. According to these 
criteria, the bonds: 
(1) should be denominated in euro and should have been issued by a non-bank 
corporation (see Column 1 in Table 3);27 
(2) should have been issued by an institution established in the euro area (we use 
the domicile provided by the TR Eikon) (see Column 2 in Table 3); 
(3) should have a remaining maturity (at the time of the purchase) of at least 28 days 
(if their initial maturity is less than one year) or of less than 31 years and more 
than six months (if their initial maturity is more than one year) (see Column 3 in 
Table 3); 
(4) should be rated investment grade (see Column 4 in Table 3).28 
The outstanding amount of the bonds included in the ECB list of bonds held under 
CSPP/PEPP is shown in Column 5 in Table 3.29 The bonds included in Column 5 are a 
subset of those of Column 4. The ECB list is determined once the ECB has applied the 
‘market neutrality’ principle to the universe of eligible bonds captured by Column 4.30 
Table A1 verifies that the sectoral decomposition in our eligible bond universe is close to 
the sectoral decomposition in the ECB list.  
The ECB list comprises 1,546 bonds whose outstanding amount is €1,073bn (as shown 
in Figure 2). As explained in A2, our analysis requires the identification of the 4-digit 
NACE sector of the bond issuer. The bonds for which the NACE sector is not available 
in TR Eikon are thereby excluded from our analysis. Therefore, the ultimate number of 
bonds in the Column 5 list of Table 3 is 1,499 (with an outstanding amount of €1,045bn). 
The match between the bonds and the companies that have issued them is made by 
using the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN). The eligible bond 
universe (Column 4) comprises 2,605 bonds whose outstanding amount is €1,473bn 
(instead of 2,715 bonds of €1,512bn, as shown in Figure 2).  
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Table A1: Eligible bond universe vs ECB list of bonds held under CSPP/PEPP, Thomson Reuters Business 
Classification (TRBC) sectoral decomposition (outstanding amount) 
Sector Eligible bond universe (%) ECB list of bonds (%) 
Automobile and auto parts 8 10 
Chemicals 3 4 
Construction, commercial services and 
materials 4 5 
Energy and applied resources 7 9 
Food and beverages 5 6 
Health care 5 5 
Infrastructure and transportation 16 14 
Insurance 4 2 
Real estate 7 7 
Technology 3 4 
Telecommunications services 7 8 
Utilities 13 16 
Other sectors 18 12 
Total 100 100 
 
Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes, as of 31 July 2020), TR Eikon (TRBC Business Sector Classification and bond 
outstanding amount, July 2020) and authors’ calculations 
Note: ‘Construction, commercial services and materials’ includes the TRBC business sectors ‘Industrial & 
Commercial Services’ and ‘Mineral Resources’; ‘Energy and applied resources’ includes the TRBC business sectors 
‘Energy - Fossil Fuels’, ‘Renewable Energy’, ‘Uranium’ and ‘Applied Resources’; ‘Health care’ includes the TRBC 
business sectors ‘Healthcare Services & Equipment’ and ‘Pharmaceuticals & Medical Research’; ‘Infrastructure 
and transportation’ includes the TRBC business sectors ‘Industrial Goods’, ‘Industrial Conglomerates’ and 
‘Transportation’; ‘Technology’ includes the TRBC business sectors ‘Technology Equipment’ and ‘Software & IT 
Services’; ‘Other sectors’ includes the TRBC business sectors ‘Banking & Investment Services’, ‘Collective 
Investments’, ‘Cyclical Consumer Products’, ‘Cyclical Consumer Services’, ‘Food & Drug Retailing’, ‘Investment 
Holding Companies’, ‘Personal & Household Products & Services’, ‘Retailers’ and unclassified companies.  
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A2. IDENTIFYING THE CLIMATE FOOTPRINT OF BONDS 
We use four ways by which we identify the climate footprint of each bond:  
(1) Whether the NACE 4-digit sector of the issuer corresponds to carbon-intensive 
activities: We identify carbon-intensive sectors following Battiston and 
Monasterolo (2019)31. The starting point is the Climate Policy Relevant Sectors 
(CPRS) classification, presented in Battiston et al. (2017)32 and Alessi et al. 
(2019)33. This classification specifies sectors that can be affected by climate 
policies and are subject to transition climate risks. However, not all of these 
sectors are necessarily carbon intensive. Battiston and Monasterolo (2019)34 have 
identified four carbon-intensive sectors, which are a subset of CPRS: (i) fossil fuel 
companies; (ii) energy-intensive companies; (iii) non-renewable utilities and (iv) 
carbon-intensive transportation. We have identified NACE 4-digit codes that 
correspond to carbon-intensive sectors following the rationale of their 
classification. However, those companies that belong to these NACE 4-digit, but 
their Thomson Reuters Business Classification (TRBC) activity or industry name is 
clearly related to renewables are not included in our carbon-intensive list. In 
particular, we exclude the companies that their TRBC activity name is ‘renewable 
utilities’ or ‘renewable independent power producers (IPPs)’ as well as those 
companies that their TRBC industry name is ‘renewable fuels’ or ‘renewable 
energy equipment & services’.  
(2) Whether the NACE 4-digit sector of the issuer corresponds to potentially green 
activities or the TRBC activity or industry name corresponds to renewables-
related activities: We use the recently developed EU Taxonomy of sustainable 
activities35 to specify what we call ‘potentially green’ sectors. The EU Taxonomy 
identifies NACE 4-digits sectors that can contribute to climate mitigation via 
activities that (i) are already low-carbon, (ii) are not low-carbon but can 
contribute to the transition to a low-carbon economy by reducing emissions, 
and/or (iii) enable other activities to achieve emissions reductions. We classify the 
companies into the following categories: ‘potentially green agriculture and 
forestry’, ‘potentially green waste management and remediation’, ‘potentially 
green construction’, ‘potentially green transportation, ‘potentially green 
information and communication’.  
A limitation of the EU classification is that it includes many carbon-intensive 
sectors; this is so primarily because there are various transition activities that can 
be undertaken in these sectors. Although we acknowledge the need for 
promoting activities that reduce emissions in carbon-intensive sectors, we find it 
misleading to call these activities ‘green’. It would be more accurate to argue that 
these are ‘dirty’ activities, whose degree of dirtiness can decline. Thus, in our 
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‘potentially green’ sectors we include all these NACE sectors that are part of the 
EU Taxonomy for climate mitigation but are not carbon intensive. We, however, 
make some exceptions, for example in the case of real estate activities and life 
insurance. Although these sectors are included in the EU taxonomy and are not 
carbon intensive, we think it is not accurate enough to call them ‘potentially 
green’, since their contribution to emission reduction is likely to be very small.  
The reason why our sectors are called ‘potentially green’ is that we do not have 
sufficient information to decide if the activities conducted by these sectors are 
actually green. The EU Taxonomy has specified screening criteria that include 
thresholds for metrics related, for example, to emission and energy generation. 
However, we do not have access to such detailed information at a sufficient 
granular level for all companies that are included in our analysis.  
On top of the ‘potentially green’ sectors, we also identify some renewable sectors 
taking into account the TRBC activity and industry name of the companies. These 
are (i) ‘renewable utilities’ (which comprise the TRBC activities ‘renewable 
utilities’ and ‘renewable independent power producers (IPPs)’), (ii) ‘renewable 
fuels’, and (iii) ‘renewable energy equipment & services’. 
(3) Whether the bond is classified as green: We use the green bond flag provided by TR 
Eikon. Eikon defines green bonds as fixed income products that offer investors 
the opportunity to participate in the financing of large sustainable energy green 
projects that help mitigate climate change and help countries adapt to the effects 
of climate change  
(4) The relative emission intensity of the issuer: We use the company-level emission 
intensity provided by TR Eikon. This is equal to the sum of Scope 1 and Scope 2 
CO2 equivalent GHG emissions of the issuers over the company revenues. The 
data that we use refer to 2019. The relative emission intensity of each company is 
given by the median emission intensity in the 1-digit NACE sector that the 
company belongs to.  
Note that a large number of corporate bonds are issued by companies that 
engage in financial service and insurance activities (sectors K.64, K.65 and K.66). 
Following Battiston and Monasterolo (2019), for the bonds that have been issued 
by these companies, we use the NACE codes and the emission intensity of the 
ultimate parent companies.   
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